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1. Introduction 
Earthquakes often strike the vulnerable parts of our society. A 7.0-magnitude earthquake 
shattered Port-au-Prince, the capital of Haiti. Based on historical records in the Port-au-
Prince area, the last large earthquake happened in 1770. Therefore, throughout its history, 
the capital of the country had never experienced any deadly earthquake, but long-lasting 
political violence. Being the poorest country in the Americas as per the Human 
Development Index, due attention has never been paid to seismic preparedness, causing the 
catastrophic devastation with 316,000 casualties to occur (Reuters, 12 January 2010). Even in 
Japan with advanced technologies in disaster preparedness, the earthquake and tsunami of 
March 11th 2011 revealed vulnerabilities of disaster prevention schemes/ systems given the 
tsunami heights exceeding the determined design heights. These devastations often cause 
long lasting problems. In Haiti 2 million people are managing to get by on food rations. In 
Japan, huge amount of tsunami debris are just piled up in temporary damp yards with the 
fear that they might have been radiation-contaminated, thus discouraging all attempts for 
quick rehabilitations. 
One of the most serious and costliest post earthquake problems is the stabilization of 
earthquake-induced landslide and debris masses. Shaking from the January 12, 2010, Haiti 
earthquake caused devastating structural damage and triggered many landslides that blocked 
roads, dammed rivers and streams, and threatened infrastructure in many parts of Haiti. 
About 4000 to 5000 landslides were estimated by the USGS (Randall at el., 2011). Many of the 
landslides blocked stream drainages and impounded lakes. In Japan, it has never been given a 
front-page coverage that total 4 billion JPY is spent annually even to this date to stabilize 
unstable debris mass of total 200 million m3 blocking the upper reaches of the 50km long 
Joganji River in Tateyama Caldera; the debris mass of total 400 million m3 at that time was 
originated in the 1858 Hietsu Earthquake with the estimated magnitude of 7 to 7.1. 
A landslide mass that blocks water and impounds a lake at its upstream is referred to as a 
“landslide dam”.  Landslide damming events are very common around the world. They 
pose hazards to the population at both their upstream and downstream areas because of 
inundations due to lake impoundment and slope stability problems associated with such 
impoundment, and the risk of downstream flooding, respectively. Researches on landslide 
dams have been focused mostly on their distribution and failure potential (e.g, Costa & 
Schuster 1988, Ermini & Casagli 2003), and less attention has been given to their emergency 
treatments. A retrogressive review of the emergency response and mitigation treatment for 
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recent landslide damming events around the world highlights the problems and uncertainty 
involved in mitigating the risk from landslide dams. 
The simplest and the most commonly used mitigation measure has been the excavation of a 
spillway which is normally constructed at the lowest point at the crest of a landslide deposit. 
The excavation of the spillway has been proven to be the best engineering technique for 
mitigating risks posed by landslide dams, and its application can be traced about 500 years 
back (Bonnard, 2006).  Sometimes blasting is also done to help excavating the channel; 
however blasting is seldom done for complete removal of large landslide masses. Drainage 
of the dammed lakes by means of pumps and siphons is a relatively less common treatment 
and is limited to small lakes. Tunnels or diversion channels are also rarely adopted as 
mitigation measures owing to the cost and time required. 
 
Fig. 1. True-color image of Tangjiashan landslide dam and dammed lake captured by 
NASA’s Earth Observing-1 (EO-1) (a) on 3rd June 2008 prior to overtopping and (b) on 8th 
June after overtopping but before the breaching of dam 
A retrogressive review of the emergency response and mitigation strategies for recent 
landslide damming events around the world is presented in this chapter. Four landslide 
dams are presented for this purpose, consisting of the Tangjiashan landslide dam which was 
triggered by the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake in China, the Higashi Takezawa landslide dam 
that was triggered by the 2004 Mid-Nigata earthquake in Japan, the Attabad landslide that 
was formed in 2010 in Hunza Pakistan, and the Hattian Bala landslide dam that was formed 
by the 2005 Kashmir earthquake in Pakistan. A brief description of the mitigation measures 
adopted for the dams is given and failures of Tangjiashan landslide dam and Hattian 
landslide dam are also explained. A detailed description of the geomorphologic changes 
resulting from the Hattian landslide dam is also provided to elucidate long lasting hazards 
that landslide dams pose to their surrounding areas.  
2. Tangjiashan landslide dam 
The Ms 8.0 Wenchuan earthquake of China occurred on 12 May 2008 that have reportedly 
created 256 landslide dams most of which were formed along the Yingxiu–Beichuan 
(Lonmenshan) fault, which was dislocated over its 270km stretch in the earthquake (Qiang 
at el., 2009). The Tangjiashan landslide dam (N31° 50' 39.54", E104° 25' 45.93") is located in 
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northern part of the fault zone, and impounded a lake on the Jiangjian River (Fig. 1). This 
lake behind the 124 m high landslide dam had a maximum storage capacity of 320 million 
m3 (Liu at el., 2010). The dam posed a great threat of flooding to the 1.2 million people living 
along the lower reach of the river, therefore required immediate mitigation measures. 
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Fig. 2. Timeline of Tangjiashan landslide dam emergency response  
2.1 Emergency response and mitigation measures 
The water level of the dammed lake initially rose at a rate of 1.2 m/day under the average 
flow rate of 80-90m3/s, and later on the rate decreased to 0.5m/day (Liu at el., 2010). Six 
towns and two cities are located downstream of the dam that were threatened to be 
inundated by the dam-break-caused flood. The dam break studies showed that a 
catastrophic flood would occur if no mitigation measures were adopted. Till 23rd of May the  
 
Fig. 3. Higashi Takezawa landslide dam and the dammed lake (Satellite imagery from 
Google Map) 
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total volume of the lake had reached 110 million m3 and then 200 million m3 till the end of 
May, 2008. The figure 2 presents the timeline of the Tangjiashan landslide dam emergency 
response. The lake hypsometric curve showed that if the lake level was kept at 740.3 m, the 
storage capacity of the lake would be reduced to 238 million m3 instead of 320 million m3 
corresponding to the natural potential overtopping level of 755.0 m (Liu at el., 2010). 
Accordingly the civil works were carried out to excavate a spillway to minimize the 
potential dam breach damage. It took 7 days work from May 26 to 31, to excavate a 13 m 
deep and 8 m wide channel covering 475 m in length. The primary intension for the 
excavation of the spillway was to reduce the total volume of the lake and meanwhile to 
create a controlled flood to drain the lake. About 275,000 people evacuated from the 
downstream areas for the expected flood. 
2.2 Retrospective review of breaching event 
The lake level reached 740 m, and the water started overflowing through the channel on 
June 7 (Qiang at el., 2009, Liu at el., 2010). The breaching process did not initiated 
immediately; instead the water kept rising for two days. A huge block slowed the channel 
erosion which was later removed by blasting on 8th June. However, no rapid flow occurred 
till 10th June when the water level reached 742 m. Then the outflow increased rapidly, and 
the channel walls and bed eroded rapidly. The outflow discharge peaked at 6420 m3/s on 
June 10, and the erosion stopped on 12th June. Downstream areas were inundated where the 
people were evacuated before the breaching. The debris mass from the breached dam were 
transported and deposited along the downstream reaches. The emergency work for 
Tangjiashan landslide dam was a successful case history of response where the early 
identification of the hazard had made it possible to map out necessary measures for the 
area.  
3. Higashi Takezawa landslide dam 
The M6.8 Mid-Niigata Prefecture earthquake of 23rd October 2004 triggered numerous 
landslides and formed more than 50 landslide dams along the Imokawa River and its 
tributaries. Among these landslide dams the most crucial dam was the Higashi Takezawa  
 
Fig. 4. Emergency works at Higashi Takezawa landsldide dam. Photo taken on 20.12.2004 by 
Takeji & Tadashi, 2005 
(a) (b) 
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landslide dam (N37° 18' 16.41", E138° 54' 16.13"), the largest landslide dam triggered by 
the  earthquake (Fig. 3). The landslide originated from the left bank of the Imokawa River 
at Higashi Takezawa district. The landslide mass was about 350 m long and had volume 
up to 1 million m3 (Sassa, 2005). The blockage started to impound a lake and soon the 
water started to inundate the Kogomo village. Due to the possible danger of overtopping 
and successive breaching of the dam emergency measure were taken to prevent the 
failure. 
3.1 Emergency response and mitigation measures 
Due to the danger of possible failure of the dammed lake, it was necessary to reduce the 
total capacity of the lake. Two possible mitigation measures were considered to cope with 
the flood hazard that the landslide dam posed. One of the possible measures was to remove 
the blockage to the original river level to drain the lake completely. This option would favor 
people living both upstream and downstream reaches of Imogawa River. However, there 
was a concern that removing only the toe part of the landslide mass would reactivate the 
movement of the remaining landslide mass. Removing the entire landslide mass would not 
be considered as a cost-effective solution. Therefore, the landslide mass was planned to be 
consolidated with the combination of diversion pipes and spillway. This meant that in 
exchange for abandonment of the upstream Kogomo village, the relevant authorities have 
secured the lower reach of the dam. Inhabitants of Kogomo Village were offered alternate 
sites for their new dwellings. 
The following steps have been taken for stabilizing the landslide mass: twelve pumps 
were installed first to lower and keep the lake water level 11.5 m below the overflow 
point. In addition, the outflow level was raised by 3 m with sand bags at the outlet. 
Keeping in view the pumping power for this temporary system, diversion pipes were 
installed in case water overtopped the landslide mass (Fig. 4). Finally, a 280m long 
concrete-faced spillway was constructed with its cross-section large enough for snow 
melts. 
Closed circuit televisions (CCTV) were installed to monitor the conditions in the catchment 
in case of emergency. Other monitoring activities included observations of cracks, 
installation of the water level gauges and monitoring the surface displacement of the 
collapsed slope. 
4. Attabad landslide dam 
On 4th January 2010 a landslide (36° 18’ 50’’N, 74° 49' 13’’E) occurred at Attabad in Hunza, 
Gilgit Baltistan. The debris mass dammed the Hunza river and formed a lake which was 120 
m deep at the saddle point of the debris mass. At about 3 km downstream of the landslide 
dam, there is a site of an older landslide that blocked a 30 km long lake that formed in 1958 
and eventually breached and caused a catastrophic flood. Prior to the 2010 Attabad 
landslide, cracks were being observed by the villagers at Attabad, which were being 
progressively lengthened. The area was declared as high hazard area by the local 
authorities, and evacuations of the affected slopes was being implemented by the end of 
2009. 
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Fig. 5. The true-color image of the Attabad landslide dam (36° 18’ 50’’N, 74° 49' 13’’E) and 
lake captured by Advanced Land Imager (ALI) on NASA’s Earth Observing-1 (EO-1) 
satellite, on (a) 16th March 2010 and (b) 23rd March 2010 
4.1 Emergency response and mitigation measures 
A lake immediately started to develop at upstream of the debris mass. The impoundment 
created huge problems for the 25,000 people living at upstream of the landslide dam. 
Mitigation studies were conducted (Petley, 2010) and as an emergency repose a 30 m deep 
spillway was planned to be excavated to reduce the maximum possible volume of the lake. 
Seepage points emerged progressively at six different locations till April 2010. Meanwhile, 
closed circuit television, (CCTV) system was installed to issue a warning in case of much 
feared seepage failure. The excavation of the spillway started on 30th January 2010. The 
surface silty-clay deposit created problems during the excavation works as the construction 
machinery were bogged down with the muddy conditions at the site, and the work was 
stopped when the excavation had reached 15 m deep across the crest till 16th May 2010. The 
water started overflowing on 29th May 2010. At the time of overtopping the lake reached a 
length of 21 km and had an estimated volume of 450 x 106 m3. Fig 5a and 4b shows the true-
color image of the Attabad landslide dam and lake captured by Advanced Land Imager 
(ALI) on NASA’s Earth Observing-1 (EO-1) satellite, on 16th March 2010 and 23rd August 
2010 respectively. About 25,000 people were cut off from the downstream population and 
are still suffering at the moment of writing. 
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4.2 Post overtopping situation 
The Attabad landslide dam survived the much feared failure upon overtopping. The dam 
has emerged as a permanent geological feature that has caused a 23 km stretch of the 
Karakorum highway and about 232 houses to be inundated (NDMA) and isolated the 
communities at its upstream reaches. Moreover the longevity of the dam is coming under 
question. Erosion of the spillway occurred at the time of overtopping that continued for 
several days which later on was followed by a slow down-cutting of the channel. The 
channel erosion was stopped by the presence of large boulders embedded in the channel 
bed, which prevented the catastrophic failure, while slowed the drainage of the lake. The 
dam survived the high discharge of glacier melting of 2010. Blasting option was considered  
 
Fig. 6. Contour map of Hattian landside, dammed lakes with their catchments and 
downstream areas. 
 
Fig. 7. Front view of the Hattian landslide mass, showing the downstream face erosion. 
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to widen the spillway in late June, 2010 which was conducted at small scale and was 
unsuccessful (Pamir Times). As the water level of the lake dropped, attempts were made to 
lower the level of the spillway in January 2011, which was eventually unsuccessful. 
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Fig. 8. Timeline of post formation features and major events at Hattian Bala landslide  
dam 
Possible failures will include those due to down cutting erosion, seepage or piping 
failure, earthquake induced dam collapse, landsliding into the lake, and the glacial lake 
outburst flood (GLOF). The concerns are rising as the water level of the lake started 
increasing in June-July 2011 because of the glacier melting. The dam is intact at the 
moment of writing; however the stability of the dam is again threatened as the monsoon 
of 2011 approaches. 
5. Hattian Bala landslide dam 
On the 8th October 2005 earthquake (epicenter 34°29′35″N, 73°37′44″E, focal depth 26 
km, 7.6 Mw (USGS)) caused widespread destruction in northern areas of Pakistan and 
Pakistan-administered Kashmir, killing more than 86,000 people. The earthquake triggered a 
large landslide mass near the south-eastern end of the Balakot-Bagh fault, the fault that 
caused the earthquake (Fig. 6). The slopes around the landslide source area have been a site 
of frequent landslide activities predating the earthquake. The 65 million m3 landslide 
destroyed a village and killed about 1000 people (about 1.1% of total earthquake casualties) 
making it one of the most devastating recorded historical landslide events (Dunning at el., 
2007). The landslide blocked two tributaries of the Karli River and created two lakes, Karli 
Lake (large lake) with a maximum natural capacity of 86 million m3, and a Tang lake (small 
lake) with maximum natural capacity of 5 million m3. Immediately the water started to be 
impounded in the two lakes behind the landslide mass, and thus a threat of dam breach 
flooding was eminent. 
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Fig. 9. (a) Satellite imageries of Karli River before and after breaching of Hattian dam 
(Google Earth), along with the maximum flow depths measured along the Karli River after 
failure of the dam (b) Profile of Hattian dam and Karli River before and after breaching of 
the Hattian dam 
5.1 Emergency response and mitigation measures 
As the water level in the lakes rose, the concern about the stability of the landslide dam 
was increasing. Mitigation studies were conducted and based on the recommendations 
the relevant authorities decided to excavate a spillway to reduce the maximum possible 
volume of the lake. The seepage through the landslide mass, the water levels and inflows 
to the lakes were continuously monitored as part of emergency response (WAPDA, 2007). 
A 450 m long spillway was excavated for the Karli Lake and relatively short 130 m 
spillway was excavated for the Tang Lake. The excavation of the spillway considerably 
reduced the total natural storage capacity of the Karli Lake from 86 million m3 to 62 
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million m3. The Tang Lake filled up in February 2006 and started overflowing. A timeline 
of various events occurring at Hattian Bala landslide dam after its formation are 
presented in figure 8. 
The debris mass developed seepage erosion and the water level of the Tang Lake gradually 
reduced by 7-8 m over a period of two months (May-June 2006) and later on reached a state 
of equilibrium between inflow and seepage discharges, keeping the lake volume at 
approximately 3.5 million m3. The Karli Lake filled up in April, 2007 and started to 
overflow. The dam survived the overtopping and hence less attention was drawn towards 
the monitoring of the dam as the spillway was performing well and no immediate threat 
was imminent. On the basis of the comparison between the volumes of the debris mass with 
the volume of the water stored in the lake the dam was thought to be stable by many 
experts. Therefore, less attention was drawn towards the monitoring of the dam site. 
However, after overtopping gradual erosion of the dam body started to occur due to the 
overflowing and seepage water. 
5.2 Breaching and breach inflected morphological changes 
Gradual toe erosion was initially observed, which was then followed by a rapid head 
cutting erosion of the downstream face of the dam (Fig. 7). On 9th February 2010, the 
water of Karli Lake breached the debris dam after five days of incessant rain, and the 
breaching drained about 36 million m3 of water from the lake. According to the back 
analysis conducted by Konagai, at el., (2011) the peak outflow was about 5500 m3/s. A 
moderate 32 mm/day rainfall was estimated on the day prior to the day of breaching. 
About 7.78 million m3 of soil was estimated to have been eroded during the breaching 
event. The flushed debris mass was deposited along the Karli River. Fig. 9 shows the 
satellite image and profile of the Karli River before and after the breaching. A major 
portion of the eroded material is deposited over the approximately 2km downstream 
stretch from the dam along Karli River and less significantly beyond the stretch. The flow 
along the Karli River reached the depth up to 20 m. The debris deposit was about 40 m 
thick near the toe of the dam. 
 
Fig. 10. (a) Satellite image of the junction of the Karli River with the Jhelum River before and 
after the breaching of Hattian dam (Google earth) 
200 m 200 m
(a) (b) 
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The dam break flood and debris destroyed one bridge near the junction of the Karli River 
with the Jhelum River and damaged about 24 houses as shown in Fig. 10. However major 
damage from the dam breach occurred as a landslide on the right bank of the Karli lake that 
was triggered by emptying of lake water. The figure 11 shows the satellite image of the right 
bank landslide after the breaching event, along with the contour map of the landslide and 
longitudinal profile of the landslide. This landslide destroyed 174 houses forcing about 1000 
residents to evacuate. 
 
Fig. 11. (a) Satellite image of the Hattian landslide dam, Karli lake and the right bank 
landslide after the breaching event, along with the contour map of the landslide, (b) the 
longitudinal profile of the right bank slide. Modified from Konagai at el., 2011 
The Tang Lake breached during the monsoon rains (July-August) of 2010. In the breaching 
process, the water from Tang Lake eroded the north-eastern end of the landslide lobe, 
which had been covered with boulders segregated up at the time of deposit, and 
approximately 15 m depth of the lake water was drained leaving 1.9 million m3 water in 
the lake (Fig. 12). 
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Fig. 12. Tang Lake after breaching (Photo taken on 6th Dec-2010). From Konagai at el., 2011 
6. Conclusion 
A review of emergency responses and mitigation strategies adopted for the landslide dams 
formed in the recent earthquakes shows the problems being faced in the risk management of 
the hazards posed by the landslide dams. Excavation of the spillway seems to be the most 
common and effective mitigation measure. Meanwhile the time seems to be the most crucial 
factor during the emergency response, as the rise of water level inundates more area at its 
upstream and increase the lake volume. Higashi Takezawa landslide dam presented an 
example where a combination of different mitigation techniques such as pumps, siphons, 
diversion channels, and spillway, were possible for the relatively small landslide mass 
which was easily accessible. For the large landslide masses at remote locations, spillway 
remains as the most suitable mitigation measure. 
It is also observed that the failure potential of landslide dammed lakes is not a well 
understood phenomenon. The Attabad landslide dam which was expected to fail upon 
overtopping due to the material composition of the dam body survived and continues to 
pose threats. On the other hand the Hattian landslide dam that seemed to be relatively 
stable and expected to remain intact, after showing some signs of instability failed as a result 
of moderate rainfall. The risk assessment for landslide dam mostly considers the expected 
inundation from dam breach, which might not be sufficient. From the case study of Hattian 
landslide it is observed that the damage resulting from the slope instability as a result of 
drawdown can be equally severe as the damage resulting from dam breach flood. 
The available response time varies from case to case, as in the case of Hattian dam it took 
over one year for the lake to fill, while Tangjiashan landslide dammed lake provided less 
then a month for the response before the lake filled. The consideration of the recent 
landslide dams and their emergency treatment leads to the conclusion that for potentially 
large landslide dams, the early identification of possible situation is essential to organize 
appropriate preventive actions in due time. A detailed knowledge of the past events like 
those mentioned above will always be helpful determining the optimum actions to be 
adopted considering the fact that the significant bases in this field are lacking. 
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